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TENNESSEE BUREAU OF WORKERS’ COMPENSATION 
WORKERS’ COMPENSATION APPEALS BOARD 
 
Reginald Miller, Sr. )    Docket No.  2018-06-0225 
 ) 
v. )    State File No. 3595-2018 
 ) 
Logan’s Roadhouse, Inc., et al. ) 
 ) 
 ) 
Appeal from the Court of Workers’ ) 
Compensation Claims ) 
Joshua D. Baker, Judge ) 
 
Affirmed in Part, Vacated in Part, and Remanded 
Filed November 15, 2018 
 
This interlocutory appeal involves an employee who suffered injuries when he passed out 
and struck his head in the kitchen of the restaurant where he worked.  The employer 
denied the claim, asserting the employee’s injuries were idiopathic and not compensable.  
The trial court found the employee was likely to prevail at trial and ordered the employer 
to pay medical expenses admitted into evidence over the employer’s objection.  The trial 
court also ordered the employer to provide medical treatment with an unauthorized 
physician selected by the employee, but denied the employee’s request for temporary 
disability benefits.  The employer has appealed.  We affirm the trial court’s conclusion 
the employee is likely to prevail at trial in establishing his injuries are compensable.  We 
further hold the trial court erred in overruling the employer’s objection to the admission 
of the disputed medical bills and vacate the portion of the court’s order requiring the 
employer to pay those bills.  Finally, we hold the trial court did not err in ordering the 
employer to provide medical treatment, but we modify the court’s order to permit the 
employer to provide a panel of physicians.  The case is remanded. 
 
Presiding Judge Marshall L. Davidson, III, delivered the opinion of the Appeals Board in 
which Judge David F. Hensley and Judge Timothy W. Conner joined. 
 
John W. Barringer, Nashville, Tennessee, for the employer-appellant, Logan’s 
Roadhouse, Inc. 
 
Reginald Miller, Sr., Portland, Tennessee, employee-appellee, pro se 
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Factual and Procedural Background 
    
 Reginald Miller, Sr. (“Employee”), a sixty-four-year-old resident of Portland, 
Tennessee, was employed by Logan’s Roadhouse, Inc. (“Employer”).  Employee alleges 
that on January 8, 2018, he was working in Employer’s kitchen while a co-worker was 
cleaning the ovens using a chemical cleaner.  Employee asserts that the fumes from the 
oven cleaner combined with the heat of the ovens caused him to become dizzy and pass 
out.  When he fell, he hit his head on some shelves.  Employer declined to provide 
workers’ compensation benefits based upon its belief that Employee’s injuries were 
idiopathic and did not arise primarily out of the employment. 
 
 Following his fall, Employee was transported to a hospital where he complained 
of headaches and neck pain.  He reported he briefly lost consciousness, fell, and, after 
waking up and trying to get up, fell again.  He was diagnosed with a laceration of his 
scalp and a contusion to his left elbow.  A CT scan revealed no evidence of intracranial 
injury, and x-rays of his elbow showed mild degenerative changes.  The laceration on his 
head was repaired with staples, and he was instructed to follow up with his primary care 
physician to have the staples removed. 
 
 Employee saw his primary care physician, Dr. Jack Patterson, on January 10, at 
which time he reported he had fallen and complained of ongoing headaches, vertigo, and 
memory loss.  He told Dr. Patterson he had been diagnosed with a concussion at the 
emergency room.  Dr. Patterson gave Employee a work excuse through January 15, when 
he was to return to have the staples removed from his head. 
 
 Employee returned to Dr. Patterson as scheduled, complaining of headaches, 
decreased strength in his left arm, numbness in the back of his head, and balance 
problems.  Dr. Patterson ordered a follow-up CT scan to rule out intracranial bleeding 
and physical therapy for Employee’s shoulder pain.  The CT scan was normal. 
 
Employee returned to Dr. Patterson three days later with ongoing complaints.  Dr. 
Patterson noted that Employee had been disabled for some time due to unrelated 
conditions and that this was the first visit at which Employee had notified his office that 
his complaints were work-related. 
 
Employee continued to see Dr. Patterson over the next several months, reporting 
headaches, memory loss, vertigo, numbness, and anxiety, among other problems.  Dr. 
Patterson indicated he had been asked about causation and impairment to which he 
responded that he was not qualified to provide an opinion.  He referred Employee to an 
orthopedic physician for his complaints of back pain with shooting pain down his legs.  
He also referred Employee to a neurologist, indicating he would defer to that physician’s 
opinion regarding whether Employee’s vertigo and headaches were related to his work 
accident. 
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Employee saw Dr. Chaitanya Malempati, an orthopedist, for his back complaints 
and was diagnosed with lumbar radiculopathy and degenerative disc disease.  He also 
saw Dr. Wesley Chou, a neurologist, complaining of headaches, dizziness, inability to 
focus, confusion, numbness and weakness on the left side of his face, and double vision.  
Lab tests were normal, as was an MRI of Employee’s brain.  The record does not contain 
an opinion regarding causation from either Dr. Malempati or Dr. Chou. 
 
Employee filed a petition for benefits and submitted various medical bills to which 
Employer objected, asserting Employee had failed to authenticate the documents or lay a 
proper foundation for their admission into evidence.  The trial court found Employee 
would likely prevail at trial on the issue of causation and overruled Employer’s objection 
to the admissibility of the medical bills and ordered Employer to pay the submitted bills.  
The court also ordered Employer to provide ongoing medical care with Dr. Patterson.  
Employer has appealed. 
 
Standard of Review 
 
The standard we apply in reviewing a trial court’s decision presumes that the 
court’s factual findings are correct unless the preponderance of the evidence is otherwise.  
See Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-239(c)(7) (2018).  When the trial judge has had the 
opportunity to observe a witness’s demeanor and to hear in-court testimony, we give 
considerable deference to factual findings made by the trial court.  Madden v. Holland 
Grp. of Tenn., Inc., 277 S.W.3d 896, 898 (Tenn. 2009).  However, “[n]o similar 
deference need be afforded the trial court’s findings based upon documentary evidence.”  
Goodman v. Schwarz Paper Co., No. W2016-02594-SC-R3-WC, 2018 Tenn. LEXIS 8, at 
*6 (Tenn. Workers’ Comp. Panel Jan. 18, 2018).  Similarly, the interpretation and 
application of statutes and regulations are questions of law that are reviewed de novo with 
no presumption of correctness afforded the trial court’s conclusions.  See Mansell v. 
Bridgestone Firestone N. Am. Tire, LLC, 417 S.W.3d 393, 399 (Tenn. 2013).  We are 
also mindful of our obligation to construe the workers’ compensation statutes “fairly, 
impartially, and in accordance with basic principles of statutory construction” and in a 
way that does not favor either the employee or the employer.  Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-
116 (2018). 
 
Analysis 
 
Employer raises several issues for our review, asserting the trial court erred: (1) in 
finding Employee was likely to prevail at trial in establishing causation; (2) in finding 
Employee was entitled to medical treatment at Employer’s expense; (3) in ordering 
Employer to pay unauthorized medical expenses; (4) in admitting medical bills into 
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evidence over Employer’s objection; and (5) in concluding Employee’s injury was not 
idiopathic.1 
 
I. 
 
As an initial matter, we note that Employer cites Tennessee Code Annotated 
section 50-6-217(a)(3) (repealed 2017) in support of its position on appeal.  Section 50-6-
217(a)(3) authorized us to reverse or modify a trial court’s decision if the rights of a party 
were prejudiced because the findings of the trial judge were “not supported by evidence 
that is both substantial and material in light of the entire record.”  However, as we have 
observed on numerous occasions, this code section was repealed effective May 9, 2017.2  
Consequently, as noted above, the standard we apply in reviewing the trial court’s 
decision presumes that the trial judge’s factual findings are correct unless the 
preponderance of the evidence is otherwise.  Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-239(c)(7). 
 
II. 
 
Causation/Idiopathic Injury 
 
 Employer first argues that Employee’s injuries are idiopathic, as there is no 
medical proof to establish his loss of consciousness was caused by his working 
                                                 
1 The record contains what purports to be a “Joint Statement of the Evidence.”  However, as this was a 
decision made on the record, there was no testimony to recite or summarize in a statement of the 
evidence.  Rather, the document filed by the parties discusses the facts of the case, the arguments of the 
parties, the issues on appeal, and the actions of the trial court.  Thus, the document filed by the parties was 
unnecessary, as its contents are readily available from the record.  See Edwards v. Fred’s Pharmacy, No. 
2017-06-0526, 2018 TN Wrk. Comp. App. Bd. LEXIS 9, at *11-12 (Tenn. Workers’ Comp. App. Bd. 
Feb. 14, 2018).  Moreover, it does not appear that the statement of the evidence was approved by the trial 
judge as required by Tenn. Comp. R. & Regs. 0800-02-22-.02(1) (2018).   
 
2 See Bullard v. Facilities Performance Grp., No. 2017-08-1053, 2018 TN Wrk. Comp. App. Bd. LEXIS 
37, at *5 (Tenn. Workers’ Comp. App. Bd. Aug. 7, 2018); Ledford v. Mid Georgia Courier, Inc., No. 
2017-01-0740, 2018 TN Wrk. Comp. App. Bd. LEXIS 28, at *4 (Tenn. Workers’ Comp. App. Bd. June 4, 
2018); Duignan v. Stowers Machinery Corp., No. 2017-03-0080, 2018 TN Wrk. Comp. App. Bd. LEXIS 
25, at *8-9 (Tenn. Workers’ Comp. App. Bd. May 29, 2018); Ogden v. McMinnville Tool & Die, Inc., No. 
2016-05-1093, 2018 TN Wrk. Comp. App. Bd. LEXIS 14, at *9-10 (Tenn. Workers’ Comp. App. Bd. 
May 7, 2018); Edwards v. Fred’s Pharmacy, No. 2017-06-0526, 2018 TN Wrk. Comp. App. Bd. LEXIS 
9, at *5-6 (Tenn. Workers’ Comp. App. Bd. Feb. 14, 2018); Bowlin v. Servall, LLC, No. 2017-07-0224, 
2018 TN Wrk. Comp. App. Bd. LEXIS 6, at *6-7 (Tenn. Workers’ Comp. App. Bd. Feb. 8, 2018); 
Thompson v. Comcast Corp., No. 2017-05-0639, 2018 TN Wrk. Comp. App. Bd. LEXIS 1, at *12-13 
(Tenn. Workers’ Comp. App. Bd. Jan. 30, 2018); Baker v. Electrolux, No. 2017-06-0070, 2017 TN Wrk. 
Comp. App. Bd. LEXIS 65, at *5-6 (Tenn. Workers’ Comp. App. Bd. Oct. 20, 2017); Butler v. AAA 
Cooper Transportation, No. 2016-07-0459, 2017 TN Wrk. Comp. App. Bd. LEXIS 54, at *5-6 (Tenn. 
Workers’ Comp. App. Bd. Sept. 12, 2017); Glasgow v. 31-W Insulation Co., Inc., No. 2017-05-0225, 
2017 TN Wrk. Comp. App. Bd. LEXIS 51, at *11-12 (Tenn. Workers’ Comp. App. Bd. Sept. 6, 2017). 
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conditions and, therefore, the proof is insufficient to establish his complaints arose 
primarily out of his employment.  We are not persuaded. 
 
An injured worker has the burden of proof on every essential element of his or her 
claim.  Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-239(c)(6).  However, at an expedited hearing, an 
employee need not prove every element of the claim by a preponderance of the evidence.  
Instead, he or she must come forward with sufficient evidence from which the trial court 
can determine the employee is likely to prevail at trial consistent with Tennessee Code 
Annotated section 50-6-239(d)(1).  McCord v. Advantage Human Resourcing, No. 2014-
06-0063, 2015 TN Wrk. Comp. App. Bd. LEXIS 6, at *9 (Tenn. Workers’ Comp. App. 
Bd. Mar. 27, 2015). 
 
To be compensable under the workers’ compensation statutes, an employee must 
establish that the injury arose primarily out of and occurred in the course and scope of the 
employment.  Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-102(14) (2018).  The term “injury” is defined as 
“an injury by accident . . . arising primarily out of and in the course and scope of 
employment, that causes death, disablement or the need for medical treatment of the 
employee.”  Id.  An idiopathic injury is one that has an unexplained origin or cause, and 
generally does not arise out of the employment unless some condition of the employment 
presents a peculiar or additional hazard.  McCaffery v. Cardinal Logistics, No. 2015-08-
0218, 2015 TN Wrk. Comp. App. Bd. LEXIS 50, at *9 (Tenn. Workers’ Comp. App. Bd. 
Dec. 10, 2015) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).  “The focus is on the 
causal link between the employment and the accident or injury, rather than a causal link 
between the employment and the idiopathic episode.”  Id. at *11. 
 
 Applying these principles to this case, the question is not whether Employee’s 
work environment caused him to pass out, but whether his work environment resulted in 
the injuries of which he complains.  The crux of Employer’s argument is that Employee’s 
claim must fail because he has not established through expert medical proof that he 
passed out as a result of fumes and heat in Employer’s kitchen.  While it is true there is 
no expert medical opinion in the record at this point in the case addressing the reason 
Employee passed out, the absence of such proof does not require a reversal as Employer 
suggests.  Rather, Employee must establish that the injuries he alleges are causally related 
to some hazard incident to the employment, regardless of whether that hazard is what 
caused Employee to pass out.  To that end, there is no dispute Employee fell at work, 
struck some shelving, and suffered an injury to his head.  While trying to get up, he fell 
again and struck his elbow.  Moreover, Employee’s testimony via an affidavit that his fall 
stemmed from the fumes from the oven cleaner coupled with the heat in the kitchen 
where he was working is uncontroverted.  While the proof at this stage of the litigation is 
not overwhelming, we cannot say that the trial court erred in its assessment of this issue.  
Again, at this interlocutory stage of the case, Employee need not prove every element of 
his claim by a preponderance of the evidence as he must at trial.  Thus, we affirm the trial 
court’s determination of this issue. 
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Admission and Payment of Medical Expenses 
 
 Next, we consider Employer’s contention that the trial court erred in overruling its 
objection to the admissibility of employee’s medical bills.  The trial court did so, stating 
Employer “objected to [the] inclusion of medical bills in the record citing lack of 
foundation and insufficient proof of reasonabl[e] medical necessity as bases for the 
objection.  The Court denies the objection.”  No explanation for the basis of the trial 
court’s ruling was provided, and the court’s decision was based upon a review of the 
record only. 
 
 We recently addressed a similar situation regarding the admissibility of medical 
bills.  In Eaves v. Ametek, Inc., No. 2016-03-1427, 2018 TN Wrk. Comp. App. Bd. 
LEXIS 53 (Tenn. Workers’ Comp. App. Bd. Sept. 14, 2018), we concluded that the 
Tennessee Rules of Evidence apply to cases in which the trial judge makes a decision on 
the record, just as they apply when the court conducts a hearing.  Id. at *7.  In Eaves, as 
in this case, the injured worker offered medical bills into evidence without the requisite 
foundation and without any proof as to whether they arose from reasonable and necessary 
medical treatment.  We concluded the trial court erred in admitting the bills and in 
ordering the employer to pay them.  Id. at *9. 
 
 Consistent with our decision in Eaves, we conclude the trial court erred in 
overruling Employer’s objection to the admissibility of the disputed medical expenses.  
Employee did not establish their admissibility pursuant to the Rules of Evidence.  
Moreover, Employee provided no evidence that the medical treatment was reasonable, 
necessary, or causally related to the work accident.  Thus, we vacate that portion of the 
trial court’s order requiring Employer to pay the medical bills at issue. 
 
Medical Treatment 
 
 Finally, Employer argues the trial court erred in awarding medical benefits 
because there was no medical proof indicating Employee’s treatment was necessary, 
reasonable, or causally related to his employment.  As discussed above, Employee has 
presented sufficient proof for the trial court to find he will likely prevail at trial in 
establishing the compensability of his claim.  Thus, he is entitled to reasonable and 
necessary medical treatment for those injuries.  However, Employer also argues that, 
should Employee be entitled to medical care, it should be allowed to provide a panel of 
physicians rather than being required to provide treatment with Employee’s primary care 
physician, Dr. Patterson.  Under the circumstances, we agree. 
 
 When an employer denies a claim, as Employer did here, it does so at the risk that, 
if the claim is later deemed compensable, it may be required to pay for medical care with 
the physician of the employee’s choosing.  See, e.g., Ducros v. Metro Roofing and Metal 
Supply Co., Inc., No. 2017-01-0228, 2017 TN Wrk. Comp. App. Bd. LEXIS 62, at *10 
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(Tenn. Workers’ Comp. App. Bd. Oct. 17, 2017) (“[A]n employer who does not timely 
provide a panel of physicians risks being required to pay for treatment an injured worker 
receives on his own.”).  Here, however, the issue is complicated by Dr. Patterson’s 
statement that he is unqualified to provide an opinion regarding causation and 
impairment.  The definition of “injury” requires the opinion of the authorized physician 
as to whether the injury is causally related to the employment.  See Tenn. Code Ann. § 
50-6-102(14)(D).  Furthermore, with respect to impairment ratings, “[a]ll permanent 
impairment ratings shall be assigned by the treating physician or chiropractor.”  Tenn. 
Code Ann. § 50-6-204(k)(1) (2018). 
 
 Because opinions concerning causation and impairment are crucial responsibilities 
of an authorized physician, and because Dr. Patterson has indicated he is unable to 
provide such opinions, it would be inconsistent with these statutes to insist he be 
designated the authorized treating physician.  Therefore, the portion of the trial court’s 
order requiring Employer to provide medical care with Dr. Patterson is modified to 
permit Employer to provide Employee a panel of physicians consistent with Tennessee 
Code Annotated section 50-6-204(a)(3)(A)(i). 
 
Conclusion 
 
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial court’s finding that Employee is 
likely to prevail at trial in establishing his injuries are compensable.  We further hold the 
trial court erred in overruling Employer’s objection to the admission of medical bills and 
vacate the portion of the court’s order requiring Employer to pay those bills.  Finally, we 
hold the trial court did not err in ordering Employer to provide medical treatment made 
reasonably necessary by the work accident, but modify the court’s order to permit 
Employer to provide a panel of physicians.  The case is remanded. 
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